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INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s single market (in financial services) is
still a goal rather than a fact, despite decades of more or less focused
effort to achieve it.1 Over the years, the European Union has moved in
the direction of achieving a single market; harmonizing rules for
securities, banking, and insurance regulation; and developing an EUlevel infrastructure for the organization of regulatory supervision.
But, whereas a true EU single market in financial services would
require centralized supervision as well as some harmonized rules of
financial regulation, the European Union as a whole has not yet
established such a system. The establishment of the European
Banking Union for the eurozone in November 2014 introduced a
system of centralized supervision of banks (but not of securities,
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1. See, e.g., Mario Mariniello, André Sapir & Alessio Terzi, The Long Road Towards the
European Single Market, BRUEGEL WORKING PAPER 2015/1 2 (Mar. 2015) (noting that a
“commonly held opinion among observers today is that the single market is far from being
complete” and fragmentation of financial markets since the financial crisis).
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insurance, or pensions markets) for a subset of EU Member States.2
Thus, in two ways the Banking Union involves separations between
the eurozone and the rest of the European Union’s financial markets:
as a more intense system of financial supervision for only some of the
EU Member States, and as a system of financial supervision focusing
on one sector of financial activity.3
These developments raise a fundamental and complex question
of how a single market in financial services for the twenty-eight EU
Member States can co-exist with a banking union for the nineteen
members of the euro area (together with non-eurozone states which
opt in to the European Banking Union).4 A move from a Europe in
which all countries had their own currencies to a Europe in which a
group of countries agreed to a common currency was originally seen
as a move towards further integration. The Economic and Monetary
Union was intended to be a component of the European single
market5 in which all Member States would ultimately participate.6

2. See, e.g., David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia., Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding
the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s Banks and ‘Completing’
Economic and Monetary Union, 51(S1) J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 103 (2013).
3. This separation between banking and other sectors of finance is less than ideal given
that insurance, securities, and banking activity are often hard to separate and, particularly
because of the post-crisis focus on the need for financial regulators to address the risks
involved in shadow banking, are categorized as banking type activity carried on by entities that
are not regulated as banks. See, e.g., Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015,
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, (Nov. 12, 2015) at 1 (“Intermediating credit through non-bank
channels can have important advantages and contributes to the financing of the real economy,
but such channels can also become a source of systemic risk, especially when they are
structured to perform bank-like functions (e.g. maturity and liquidity transformation, and
leverage) and when their interconnectedness with the regular banking system is strong.”).
4. Cf. Pia Hüttl & Dirk Schoenmaker, Should the ‘Outs’ Join the European Banking
Union?, BRUEGEL POLICY CONTRIBUTION, Issue 2016/03 (Feb. 2016). See also, e.g. Niamh
Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1609, 1612 (2014) (noting that “[i]nstitutional reform directed to executive supervisory
governance—and primarily to the euro area—is a constitutional and political novelty”).
5. See, e.g., Charles R. Bean, Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, 6 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 31, 32 (1992); Jean-Claude Trichet, The Euro After Two Years, 39 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 1, 7 (2001) (“The euro is the crowning achievement of the single market.”).
6. See, e.g., Regulation (EEC) No. 907/73 establishing a European Monetary
Cooperation Fund, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. L 89/2 (Apr. 3, 1973)
(noting that “the purpose of the Fund must be to contribute to the progressive establishment of
an Economic and Monetary Union between the Member States of the European Economic
Community, which, in its final stage as regards its monetary aspects will have the following
characteristics: - either the total and irreversible convertibility, at irrevocable parities, of
Community currencies against each other, or the introduction of a common currency”).
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By November 2015 the European Banking Union had been in
operation for a year.7 From the time that a European Banking Union
was proposed in 2012,8 the United Kingdom repeatedly expressed
concern that the European Banking Union would disrupt the
European Union’s single market in financial services9; this concern
found new expression in the United Kingdom’s attempts to
renegotiate the terms of its relationship with the rest of the European
Union.10 In February 2016, the European Council reached an
agreement on new arrangements for the United Kingdom’s
relationship with the European Union, which included an agreement
on financial services (“the Decision”).11 The European Council
acknowledged that European Union “processes make possible
different paths of integration for different Member States, allowing
those that want to deepen integration to move ahead, whilst respecting
the rights of those which do not want to take such a course.”12 The
Decision stated commitments to the single market and the euro area,
cited mutual respect and sincere co-operation between the euro-area
and non-euro-area States, and declared:
It is acknowledged that Member States not participating in the
further deepening of the economic and monetary union will not
create obstacles to but facilitate such further deepening while this
7. Danièle Nouy: The Single Supervisory Mechanism after One Year: The State of Play
and the Challenges Ahead, Speech by Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the
Single Supervisory Mechanism, Banca d’Italia conference Micro and Macroprudential
Banking Supervision in the Euro Area, at the Università Cattolica, Milan, 24 Nov. 2015.
8. Herman Van Rompuy, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, REPORT
BY PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (June 26, 2012).
9. See, e.g., Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the
European Union, CM 8415, 10 (July 2012) (“the Government will: continue to encourage and
support the steps needed to ensure stability and strengthened governance in the Eurozone;
ensure that action to tackle the crisis in the Eurozone protects the unity and integrity of the
single market;. . . work for more effective regulation of the financial sector which ensures
financial stability and protects UK interests”).
10. See, e.g., The Best of Both Worlds: The United Kingdom’s Special Status in a
Reformed European Union, HM GOVERNMENT 15 (Feb. 2016) (“The UK supports the
Eurozone’s efforts to reform. However, as the Eurozone takes the steps it needs to succeed, it
is equally important that the UK is not forced to participate and does not have its interests
undermined. In the past, this has not always been clear. For example, when the Eurozone
agreed to establish a Banking Union, the UK had to negotiate to ensure that it would not
include the UK.”).
11. Decision of the Heads of State or Government meeting within the European Council,
Concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom Within the European Union, Annex I to
European Council Conclusions, EUCO 1/16 (Feb. 19, 2016).
12. Id. at 9.
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process will, conversely, respect the rights and competences of
the non-participating Member States.13

The attempt to coordinate the requirements of protecting both the euro
area and the single market focuses on prohibiting discrimination
between people and firms based on currency (rather than on the basis
of objective reasons) and on identifying the entities to be subject to
Banking Union rules.14 A Draft Council Decision would provide for a
Member State that does not participate in the banking union to give its
reasoned opinion opposing the adoption of legislation by qualified
majority, leading to additional discussion of the issue.15
The February 2016 Decision has both political and legal
implications. And although UK authorities have been concerned to
emphasize that an agreement between Heads of State and
Government is legally binding,16 it is unclear how useful its language
is as a legally binding text because its provisions are amenable to
different interpretations. The language of the Decision is likely to
influence the way in which Member States discuss policy relating to
financial regulation. But from a legal perspective, the Decision’s
suggestion that it should be possible to identify which potential
European Banking Union measures would be consistent or
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id. at 13 (“Union law on the banking union conferring upon the European Central
Bank, the Single Resolution Board or Union bodies exercising similar functions, authority over
credit institutions is applicable only to credit institutions located in Member States whose
currency is the euro or in Member States that have concluded with the European Central Bank
a close cooperation agreement on prudential supervision, in accordance with relevant EU rules
and subject to the requirements of group and consolidated supervision and resolution.”).
15. Id. at Annex II (Draft Council Decision on Specific Provisions Relating to the
Effective Management of the Banking Union and of the Consequences of Further Integration
of the Euro Area).
16. See, e.g., Letter from Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, to Rt. Hon
Andrew Tyrie MP, Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee (Mar. 7, 2016), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/treasurycommittee/other/gove
rnorletter070316.pdf at 6 (“The section on economic governance and the emergency brake are
clearly intended by the parties to be legally binding and will enter into force upon notification
of the UK’s intention to remain in the EU, which would be expected to occur if there is a vote
in the referendum favour of doing so. The International Law decision is an agreement
concluded in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
consequently has interpretative effect. The European Court of Justice accepts that such
international agreements entered into by the signatories to the Treaties are instruments of
interpretation which must be taken into account.”); The Best of Both Worlds, supra note 10, at
8 (“All EU Member States have signed up to these principles in a decision under international
law, giving us far greater certainty than we have ever had in the past that the UK’s rights as a
country that does not use the euro will be respected. These principles will be incorporated into
the Treaties when they are next revised.”).
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inconsistent with the single market is more problematic. Does the
single market merely prohibit the ECB from establishing barriers to
the freedom to provide services into the euro area that would be
prohibited to an individual Member State, or does the logic of the
single market restrict the ability of the ECB to provide support to
eurozone banks that allow them to compete on unequal terms with
non-eurozone banks? The Decision addresses this issue by defining
separate spheres of support for the euro and non-euro areas, but
focusing on the responsibility for bearing the costs of such support
rather than on the impact of the support on conditions of competition
in the single market.17 The Court of Justice’s tolerance of emergency
measures adopted by the ECB so far18 suggests that it may be willing
to defer to the ECB when it acts to promote financial stability.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMU AND THE SINGLE MARKET
Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”) is a component of the
European Union in which all of the Member States participate,
although they do so in different ways. The Maastricht Treaty
specified EMU as an EU goal, although the United Kingdom and
Denmark negotiated opt-outs.19 Nevertheless the United Kingdom and
Denmark are subject to the European Semester, the mechanism for
coordination of economic policies of the EU Member States
introduced in 2011.20
Until the onset of the financial crisis the eurozone and the EU
single market in financial services did not seem to be inconsistent
with each other. Financial regulation was an area of the internal
market in which the EU institutions developed harmonized rules,
subject to subsidiarity. Some commentators suggested that this failure
to think about financial regulation as a component of economic and

17. Decision Concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom, supra note 11.
18. See, e.g., Gauweiler and Others [2015] EUECJ C-62/14 (June 16, 2015).
19. See, e.g., Rebecca Adler-Nissen, OPTING OUT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (2014).
20. See, e.g., Claire A. Dunlop & Claudio M. Radaelli, Policy Learning in the Eurozone
Crisis: Modes, Power and Functionality, Policy Sciences (2015) DOI 10.1007/s11077-0159236-7. One component of the European Semester is country reports on the Member States.
See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, EU Commission Staff Working
Document, Country Report United Kingdom 2016, SWD (2016) 96 Final (Feb. 2016);
Commission of the European Communities, EU Commission Staff Working Document,
Country Report Denmark 2016, SWD (2016) 74 Final (Feb. 2016).
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monetary union was significant and problematic,21 and others
suggested that the ideal situation was one in which all Member States
were also in the euro area22 (which would have had a similar effect of
conforming financial regulation and economic governance). But
developing coordination in the eurozone and in the context of the
single market arguably reduced the number of barriers within the
broader market rather than erecting new barriers.23 In 2004 the
Commission wrote that the euro was contributing to financial market
integration.24 The United Kingdom was content to be inside the
(incomplete) single market yet outside the euro area.25 Commentators
noted that in the United States, with a single currency and a national
market there were discrepancies between economic conditions in
different parts of the country.26 Indeed, the rationale of the single
market is that factors of production should be able to move to the
locations where they can be put to best use. The opening up of the
national markets to the forces of competition would increase
consumer welfare and inefficient, uncompetitive businesses would
fail. However, this “creative destruction dynamic” has never operated
fully in the European Union.27 Regulatory barriers to entry persisted

21. See Victoria Chick & Sheila Dow, Regulation and Differences in Financial
Institutions, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 517, 518-19 (1996) (“The question of bank supervision gets
barely a mention in the Maastricht Treaty. It is seen as separable from the issue of monetary
control. And yet there are plans for deposit insurance, and one hopes that the ECSB will, at
least in extremis, be prepared to act as lender of last resort. To separate these matters is bizarre
and irresponsible.”); Jean Dermine, European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart before
the Horse, 15 FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 57, 61 (2006) (“It is
only in very special circumstances, and with unanimity in the European Council, that the ECB
will be allowed to regulate or supervise financial institutions.”).
22. See, e.g., Trichet, supra note 5.
23. Although cf. Nicole Scicluna, When Failure isn’t Failure: European Union
Constitutionalism after the Lisbon Treaty, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 441, 452 (2012)
(“[T]he very projects that were meant to unite European citizens and promote their common
identity, such as the euro, are now straining transnational solidarity and producing a rise in
nationalist and protectionist sentiments.”).
24. See, e.g., European Commission, EMU After Five Years, European Economy Special
Report No. 1/2004, at 14 (2005).
25. Cf. David Barr, Francis Breedon & David Miles, Life on the Outside: Economic
Conditions and Prospects Outside Euroland, 18 ECON. POLICY 573, 601-02 (2003) (evaluating
whether the ins or outs had done better after the introduction of the euro, but noting “no
evidence that EMU has yet influenced financial market location, and that London’s position as
the principal financial center in Europe appears to have been unaffected by its being outside of
the euro zone.”).
26. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 5.
27. See, e.g., Mariniello et al. supra note 1, at 17.
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over time,28 the Commission was slow to take action with respect to
State aids,29 and the European Union had programs for regional and
sectoral financial support—all alongside a rhetoric of
competitiveness.30 Notably, a demand for increasing the EU’s focus
on competition and competitiveness was part of the UK’s
renegotiation with the European Union in 2016 and was reflected in
the European Council’s Decision.31
The financial crisis tended to emphasize geographic borders
within the European Union and increase fragmentation in the EU’s
financial markets32 as Member State Governments intervened to
support their own financial firms.33 The Commission reacted by
developing guidelines for the provision of State aid to financial
institutions under stress, recognizing that crisis conditions made
financial support inevitable.34 The crisis also led to a new focus
28. See, e.g., Federica Mustilli & Jacques Pelkmans, Access Barriers to Services
Markets: Mapping, Tracing, Understanding and Measuring, CEPS Special Reports No. 77
(June 2013) at 3 (noting that the “combination of intra-EU ‘free exchange’, EU regulation and
EU competition policy yields a market environment that is radically distinct from worldwide
exchange. And yet, there are still barriers in the EU services markets, albeit far less than (say)
a decade ago, let alone two decades ago.”).
29. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Progress Report Concerning
the Reduction and Reorientation of State Aid, COM (2002) 555 Final (Oct. 2002), at 2 (noting
that the Stockholm European Council had in 2001 stated that the level of state aids must be
reduced). Cf. Michael Blauberger, Of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Subsidies: European State Aid
Control through Soft and Hard Law, 32 W. EUR. POL. 719, 720 (2013) (noting that, in
“balancing the general prohibition on state aid against possible exceptions, the Commission
has always had to assess, at least implicitly, not only the effects that a certain state aid measure
would have on competition, but also its potential contributions to other policy goals such as
competitiveness or cohesion.”).
30. See, e.g., Single Market Integration and Competitiveness in the EU and its Member
States: Report 2015 (Oct. 28, 2015).
31. Decision Concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom, supra note 11.
32. See, e.g., Howarth & Quaglia, supra note 2, at 104-07.
33. This development is not unique to the European Union. Generally the financial crisis
tended to undermine the internationalization of the financial markets as states intervened to
support domestic financial firms and sought to protect national markets from risks associated
with foreign firms. See, e.g., Louise C. Bennetts & Arthur S. Long, The New Autarky? How
U.S. and UK Domestic and Foreign Banking Proposals Threaten Global Growth, Cato
Institute Policy Analysis, No. 743 (Nov. 21, 2013). Transnational policy makers’ emphasis of
interconnectedness as a source of risk to financial stability arguably encouraged this
balkanization. See, e.g., Nicolas Arregui, Mohamed Norat, Antonio Pancorbo & Jodi Scarlata,
Addressing Interconnectedness: Concepts and Prudential Tools, IMF Working Paper
WP/13/199 (Sept. 2013).
34. See, e.g., Commission Communication on the Application, from 1 August 2013, of
State Aid Rules to Support Measures in Favour of Banks in the Context of the Financial Crisis,
July 30, 2013, 2013 O.J. C 216/1, at 1-2 (“The evolution of the crisis has required the
adaptation of some provisions of the State aid framework dealing with the rescue and
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among the G20 countries on financial stability as an objective of
financial regulation35 (a focus which encompasses increasing numbers
of policy issues).36 But State support of financial firms in the EU led
to the development of a European sovereign debt crisis.37 The
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis prompted the EU
to act38 to preserve confidence in the financial markets,39 particularly
to reinforce economic governance and banking regulation for the euro
area.40 The transnational response to the financial crisis required the
EU to conform its developing system of financial regulation to the
transnational standards developed through the Financial Stability
Board and transnational standard setting bodies (the Basel Committee
for Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions and the International Association of Insurance

restructuring of firms in difficulty while not ruling out the possibility of accessing,
exceptionally, significant public support.”).
35. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report
2015, supra note 3.
36. See, e.g., Communiqué, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, ,
Washington D.C., (April 17, 2015) (“We ask the FSB to convene public- and private-sector
participants to review how the financial sector can take account of climate-related issues.”).
37. See, e.g., Nicholas Dorn, Regulatory Sloth and Activism in the Effervescence of
Financial Crisis, 33 L. & POLICY 428, 428 (2011) (“In 2010 it became clear that sovereign
states, which had ‘bailed out’ the banking sector, were themselves becoming targets of a
mixture of speculation and genuine fears and uncertainties over their financial health.”).
38. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Commission Work Programme
2012: Delivering European Renewal, COM (2011) 777 Final (Nov. 2011), at 2 (“The
European Union is confronted with the challenge of a generation. An economic challenge, that
affects families, businesses and communities across Europe. But also a political challenge, to
show that the European Union is equal to the task. The European Union can and should make a
real difference to how Europeans face up to today’s crisis.”).
39. See, e.g., Sebastian Schich, Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and Related
Financial Safety Net Aspects, 95 FIN. MKT. TRENDS (OECD 2008/2) (noting changes to
deposit insurance schemes in response to the crisis, including, at 91-92, proposed changes in
the European Union).
40. See, e.g., Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi &
Martin Schulz, COMPLETING EUROPE’S ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (June 22, 2015)
(Five Presidents’ Report). Cf. International Monetary Fund, Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article
IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No.12/181 (July 2012), at 10 (“Only a convincing and
concerted move toward a more complete EMU could arrest the decline in confidence engulfing
the region. A credible roadmap toward a full banking union and fiscal integration will make
the short-term crisis measures more effective. Structural reforms throughout the euro area will
also be necessary to revive growth in the long run, while macroeconomic policies can smooth
the needed adjustment in the short run.”).
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Supervisors).41 But the sovereign debt crisis required a particular
focus on the supervision of euro area banks.42
The euro area crisis emphasized the distinctions between the
euro area countries and the EU Member States outside the euro area.
Solidarity between the stronger and weaker euro area countries was
hard enough to achieve, although work on developing economic and
monetary union since the crisis has emphasized solidarity.43 Countries
outside the eurozone felt even less solidarity with eurozone countries
in difficulty.44 Moreover, the reinforcement of the euro area with new
harmonized rules of banking regulation45 and new supervisory
arrangements46 potentially set up new barriers between the eurozone
and the rest of the EU. Financial stability demands protecting the
market or markets for which a policy-maker is responsible from risks
generated elsewhere, as well as preventing the market(s) for which
41. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence to
International Standards (Jan. 9, 2010). The ECB and the Commission are members of the FSB.
See Charter of the Financial Stability Board (June 2012), List of FSB Members (as amended
on Mar. 26, 2015).
42. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, Minimal Conditions for the
Survival of the Euro, 51 INTERECONOMICS 24, 26 (2016) (“As the point is sometimes put,
monetary union without banking union will not work.”); Rishi Goyal et al., A Banking Union
for the Euro Area, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/13/01 (Feb. 13, 2013).
43. See, e.g., Five Presidents’ Report, supra note 40, at 4 (“This common destiny
requires solidarity in times of crisis and respect for commonly agreed rules from all
members.”).
44. Consider, for example, the way the UK Chancellor spoke about Greece’s problems in
the summer of 2015. See HM Treasury Press Release, Chancellor’s Statement on Greece: 6
July 2015 (July 6, 2015) (“Britain will be affected the longer the Greek crisis lasts, and the
worse it gets. There is no easy way out. But even at the eleventh hour we urge the Eurozone
leaders and Greece to find a sustainable solution.”).
45. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 Establishing a Single Resolution
Mechanism for the Banking Union, 2014 O.J. L 225/1. The Regulation is an internal market
measure based on Article 114 of the TFEU, and participation in the Single Resolution
Mechanism is open to all EU Member States, although it is specifically designed as a
component of the European Banking Union. See also, e.g., Commission of the European
Communities, Proposal for a Regulation Amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in Order to
Establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, COM (2015) 586 Final (Nov. 2015). The
proposal, which is also based on Article 114 TFEU, argues that the introduction of a eurozone
deposit insurance scheme would benefit non-eurozone banks. Id. at 4 (“Risks would be spread
more widely, enhancing financial stability not only in the Member State concerned but also in
other participating and non-participating Member States, by limiting potential contagion
effects. Moreover, it will help restore the level playing field in the internal market by limiting
the competitive disadvantage that sound banks are suffering because of their place of
establishment.”).
46. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1024/2013 on Conferring Specific Tasks on the
European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions, 2013 O.J. L 287/63.
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the policy-maker is responsible from being a source of risk to other
markets. If the need to ensure financial stability within the eurozone
were to lead to restrictions on relationships between eurozone and
non-eurozone banks, the freedom of the non-eurozone banks to
operate within the EU single market would be restricted. The UK
originally tried to address this type of risk by negotiating specific
protections for its financial markets by means of a requirement for
double majority voting.47
By 2016 the question of how the European Banking Union and
the EU single market could operate together was still an issue at least
for the UK, as it renegotiated the terms of its relationship with the EU
and prepared for a referendum on the issue of whether the UK would
remain in the EU or not (colloquially referred to as “Brexit”).48 From
a political perspective, the United Kingdom’s concerns make sense,
as the United Kingdom is the site of one of the world’s major
financial markets and UK governments have been determined to
ensure that EU measures relating to financial regulation should not
harm those markets.49
The eurozone is not the only aspect of the European Union that
involves different Member States participating in the European Union
on different terms in ways that may have an impact on the single
market.50 For example, the Commission proposed a directive for
eleven Member States to introduce a financial transactions tax after it
became apparent that the European Union as a whole was unlikely to
agree to such a tax.51 Denmark has opted out of some EU home
47. See, e.g., House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Future of the
European Union: UK Government Policy, First Report of Session 2013–14 HC 87-I , Vol. I
(June 11, 2013) at 7. Cf. Howarth & Quaglia, supra note 2, at 114-16 (discussing
developments leading up to agreement of the double majority voting system in the EBA).
48. See, e.g., European Union Referendum Act 2015 c. 36; House of Lords European
Union Committee, The EU Referendum and EU Reform, HL 122 (Mar. 30, 2016).
49. The UK government is committed to encouraging financial activity in the United
Kingdom. See, e,.g., Harriett Baldwin, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, in Ernst & Young,
UK FinTech: On the Cutting Edge (Feb. 24, 2016) at 3 (“The UK Government is committed to
supporting the development of the UK’s FinTech sector.”) Trade Groups advocate action to
protect London as a financial centre. See, e,g, TheCityUK, Key Facts about the UK as an
International Financial Centre Report 2015 (July 2015).
50. See, generally, e.g., Adler-Nissen, supra note 20.
51. Commission of the European Communities, EU Commission Proposal for a
Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax,
COM (2013) 71 Final (Feb. 2013), at 3. As of early 2015, it was not clear that the eleven
Member States would agree to the proposal. See, e.g., France Says Financial Transaction Tax
Talks Deadlocked, Reuters Business (Mar. 10, 2016).
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affairs legislation,52 and in a 2015 referendum the Danish people
voted to continue this opt-out. The UK and Ireland both have a right
to choose whether to opt in to justice and home affairs measures.
These opt-outs have implications for regulation of the internal market
as well as for home affairs, to the extent that the criminal law is used
to regulate the markets. In 2014 the EU adopted a Directive on
criminal sanctions for market abuse (insider trading and market
manipulation); while Denmark is not subject to the Directive and the
UK chose not to opt in (and so is also not subject to the Directive),
Ireland chose to opt in.53 For years, commentators on the EU have
argued about the benefits and detriments of variable geometry54 or a
two- or more speed Europe. The Schengen Area, currently challenged
by the EU’s refugee crisis,55 includes four EFTA countries and
twenty-four of the EU Member States.
Closer co-operation between some Member States of the EU in
certain areas means that different Member States are subject to
different rules, but the Banking Union raises greater possibilities for
conflict with the single market than do other arrangements Although
the UK has not opted into the EU’s requirements for criminal
sanctions for market abuse, the UK does impose criminal sanctions
for insider trading and market manipulation and has successfully
prosecuted insider traders for violations of the law. But the ECB’s
responsibility for supervising eurozone banks may lead it to
distinguish between financial firms based in and outside the euro area
on the basis of concerns about financial stability. Although the
February Decision precludes discrimination based on currency, it
does not preclude discrimination “on the basis of objective reasons.”56
The meaning of this phrase is unclear. The Governor of the Bank of
52. See, e.g., Denmark Votes No on Adopting EU Rules, BBC (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35002158.
53. Directive 2014/57/EU on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, 2014 O.J. L
173/179, Recitals 29-31.
54. See, e.g., J. A. Usher, Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles: Patterns for the
European Union, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 243 (1997); Fabrizio Tassinari, Variable
Geometries: Mapping Ideas, Institutions and Power in the Wider Europe, CEPS Working
Document No. 254 (Nov. 2006).
55. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Seventh bi-annual report on
the functioning of the Schengen area 1 November 2014 - 30 April 2015, COM (2015) 236
Final (May 2015); Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the State of
Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration,
COM (2016) 85 Final (Feb. 2016).
56. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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England has suggested that he is happy that the February 2016
Decision prohibits discrimination based on currency as an addition to
existing legal restrictions on discrimination based on nationality.57
Perhaps especially as the Chair of the Financial Stability Board,58
Mark Carney is unlikely to be able to imagine circumstances in which
the ECB might take action based on “objective reasons” which might
limit the rights of a particular bank regulated by the UK financial
regulators to be involved in financial activity in the euro area. The
problem would arise if UK regulators took different views of the risk
profile of a particular UK-based and regulated financial institution
from those of the ECB where the ECB wished to limit the interactions
of that financial institution with euro area banks. The Gauweiler
decision59 suggests that the Court of Justice might be inclined to defer
to the judgments of the ECB in circumstances implicating issues of
financial stability.
Before the establishment of the European Banking Union, the
ECB published a Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework in July
2011 which argued that the Eurosystem’s responsibility under Article
127 (2) TFEU to promote the smooth operation of payment systems
as a component of financial stability meant that “the development of
major euro financial market infrastructures that are located outside of
the euro area” would be a problem.60 The document stated:
As a matter of principle, infrastructures that settle eurodenominated payment transactions should settle these
transactions in central bank money and be legally incorporated in
the euro area with full managerial and operational control and
responsibility over all core functions for processing euro
denominated transactions, exercised from within the euro area.61

57. See supra note 16 at 9 (“It is welcome that the Settlement reinforces the principle
that discrimination, including on grounds of currency, is not permitted in the EU. Taken
together with the existing Treaty prohibitions on discrimination on the grounds of nationality,
paragraph 1 of Section A also provides protection against discrimination based on place of
incorporation or the currency of the place of incorporation.”).
58. Profile, Mark Carney, http://www.fsb.org/profile/mark-carney/.
59. See supra note 18. Cf. Valia Babis, The Power to Ban Short-selling and Financial
Stability: the Beginning of a New Era for EU Agencies?, 73 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 269 (2014)
(noting, with respect to a different decision, that “the judgment re-confirms the view that the
Court will be very reluctant to strike down mechanisms put in place to safeguard financial
stability, even if this means stretching the existing legal framework”).
60. European Central Bank, Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework (July 2011) at 9.
61. Id. at 10.
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Exceptions to this policy would be accepted only “in very specific
circumstances and only on a case-by-case basis.”62 In addition,
Central Counterparties (“CCPs”) “that hold on average more than 5%
of the aggregated daily net credit exposure of all CCPs for one of the
main euro-denominated product categories...should be legally
incorporated in the euro area with full managerial and operational
control and responsibility over all core functions, exercised from
within the euro area.”63 The UK challenged the document and in
March 2015 the General Court held that the Policy Framework was an
act intended to have legal effects, and thus could be challenged and,
on the merits held that the ECB’s jurisdiction to promote the smooth
operation of payment systems under Article 127 TFEU related to the
payment of funds and not to securities transactions:
a “payment system” within the meaning of Article 127(2) TFEU
falls within the field of the transfer of funds. Therefore, whilst
such a definition may include the “cash” leg of clearing
operations, that is not true of the “securities” leg of the clearing
operations of a CCP, since while such securities may be regarded
as being the subject-matter of a transaction giving rise to the
transfer of funds, they do not, however, in themselves constitute
payments.64

The ECB did not benefit from any implied power to regulate
securities clearing systems, and if it desired such a power, it should
ask the legislature to grant it.65
After the judgment the ECB and the Bank of England announced
that they had reached agreement on the exchange of information and
cooperation with respect to UK CCPs with significant eurodenominated business.66 The UK announced that it would therefore
withdraw two remaining challenges to the ECB location policy.67
Since the publication of the Eurosystem Policy Framework the
regulation of financial market infrastructures has been a visible
component of evolving transnational standards for financial
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. United Kingdom v European Central Bank, Case T-496/11 (Mar. 4, 2015), ¶97.
65. See infra ¶¶ 107-09.
66. Press Release, European Central Bank, European Central Bank and Bank of England
Announce Measures to Enhance Financial Stability in Relation to Centrally Cleared Markets in
the EU (Mar. 29, 2015).
67. Press Release, HM Treasury, Government to Withdraw Remaining Legal Challenges
to ECB Location Policy (Mar. 29, 2015).
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stability,68 and within the EU CCPs regulated in one of the EU
Member States are authorized under the European Market
Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”) to provide services throughout
the EU.69 The European Securities Markets Authority (“ESMA”) is
working on promoting common supervisory approaches and practices
in the application of EMIR in the EU.70 The EU has also worked with
the US to develop a common approach for the regulation of
transatlantic CCPs.71 To the extent that EU rules relating to CCPs are
effectively harmonized and enforced in a consistent manner, this
should reduce the ECB’s desire to exercise its power in this area.
However, although the question of the extent of the ECB’s
powers to regulate CCPs was resolved in a way that allowed for an
accommodation between preserving financial stability in the euro area
and the demands of an EU single market, the case does illustrate some
of the problems that an intensified focus on financial stability in the
eurozone poses for financial regulation and the single market in
financial services generally. The ECB argued that the UK did not
even have standing to challenge the Policy Framework as an actor
outside the euro area.72 The General Court rejected this argument.73
But more significantly, in a world in which financial stability is
conceptualized in broad, all-encompassing terms, the ECB’s decision
68. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial
Regulatory Reforms, Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders (Nov. 9, 2015) at
1 (noting that implementation of reforms of the OTC derivatives markets was progressing);
Financial Stability Board, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Tenth Progress Report on
Implementation (Nov. 4, 2015) at 1 (“International work is also underway to ensure the
robustness and resilience of central clearing, and there are ongoing multilateral and bilateral
discussions to address cross -border regulatory issues.”).
69. Regulation No. 648/2012 OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade
Repositories, O.J. L 201/1 (July 27, 2012).
70. See, e.g., European Securities Markets Authority, Questions and Answers:
Implementation of the Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central
Counterparties and Trade Repositories (EMIR), ESMA/2016/242 (Feb. 4, 2016).
71. See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, European Commission and the
United States Commodity Futures Commission: Common Approach for Transatlantic CCPs
(Feb. 10, 2016).
72. United Kingdom v. European Central Bank, Case T-496/11 (Mar. 4, 2015) ¶69 (“The
ECB contends that, even if it is concluded that the Policy Framework is a binding act, the
United Kingdom does not have standing to bring an action against it, on the ground that it does
not participate in certain aspects of economic and monetary union. The ECB refers, in this
connection, to the fact that Protocol No 15 to the FEU Treaty on certain provisions relating to
the United Kingdom excludes the application in the United Kingdom’s regard of certain
provisions of the FEU Treaty and the Statute, including Article 127(1) to (5) TFEU.”).
73. Id. at ¶73.
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to deal with the implications of securities settlement systems for euro
payment systems seems self-evident.74 The General Court’s decision
suggests that the ECB would need to deal with such issues through
negotiation with financial regulators outside the euro area, or seek
new formal powers from the EU legislature, but the issues will not
disappear entirely. The development of the Banking Union
empowered the ECB,75 and it is not clear yet how it will use its
powers. To some extent the separation within the ECB between
responsibilities for financial policy and for financial supervision may
help address these issues,76 although it is not clear conceptually to
what extent financial stability (now recognized as an important
component of financial regulation) can be separated from financial
supervision.
The Member States outside the euro area do have an interest in
the maintenance of financial stability within the eurozone as financial
instability originating in the eurozone could spread through the EU
more generally. This is especially the case for the UK,77 but could
affect other Member States outside the euro area as well. Thus, some
actions that the ECB might take to prevent financial instability would
be beneficial to non-eurozone EU Member States.
The adoption of more uniform rules for the EU generally would
be one way of addressing the issue of difference between euro and
non-euro areas. The European Union’s financial services rules have
already become more uniform since the financial crisis in a number of
different ways in some cases the EU has adopted new substantively
uniform rules, but the EU has also increased use of regulations rather
than directives, and has allowed EU agencies to regulate some
financial market activity directly rather than by negotiating with
national regulators. But the idea of a single market generally, and
with respect to financial services specifically, is one which is rather
amorphous and difficult to specify: different stakeholders imagine the
74. See, e.g., Andrew Large, Group of 30, Financial Stability Governance Today: A Job
Half Done, Occasional Paper 92 (2015).
75. See, e.g., Rachel A. Epstein & Martin Rhodes, The Political Dynamics Behind
Europe’s New Banking Union, 39 W. EUR. POL. 415, 417-18 (2016).
76. See, e.g., https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/organisation/decision-making/
html/index.en.html (“To prevent conflicts of interest between monetary policy and supervisory
responsibilities, the ECB ensures a separation of objectives, decision-making processes and
tasks. This includes strict separation of the Governing Council’s meetings.”).
77. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 17, at 11 (noting that work on euro area financial
stability enhances UK financial stability).
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necessary rules for the single market in diverse ways. The next
section of this Article considers what the EU meant by the idea of a
single market.
II. A SINGLE MARKET IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
In prospect, the single market has often been characterized as
requiring a limited set of new rules or the elimination of specific
identified barriers.78 Harmonization of the laws of the Member States
has been achieved to varying degrees with respect to different subject
matters, incrementally and in piecemeal fashion. Over time the
requirements of the European rules have changed as well as the
relationship between European-level and national-level decisionmaking and administration. Some level of regulatory harmonization is
assumed to be necessary to facilitate the movement of factors of
production across the geographic borders between the Member States,
but how much harmonization or how much regulatory differentiation
is consistent with the idea of a single market has never been
completely clear. These issues arise in the context of negative
integration (what rules of the Member States are permissible despite
the Treaty freedoms of goods, persons, services and capital) and
positive integration (what powers do the EU institutions have to
establish harmonized rules for the internal market). In some cases the
Court of Justice is invited to consider whether EU rules are
impermissible infringements of the Treaty freedoms.79
The plan to achieve a single market by the beginning of 1993
was based on an idea of agreed minimum standards for banking,
securities and insurance, combined with a principle of mutual
recognition which would allow financial firms authorized in one
Member State to do business in other Member States on the basis of
their home State authorization.80 At the same time, EU measures to
achieve this single market allowed host Member States to apply some
public interest measures to financial activity within their territory.81
78. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Commission White Paper:
Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310 Final (June 1985).
79. See, e.g., Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, ¶¶ 33-34; Alliance for Natural Health
v. Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-6451, [2005] EUECJ C-154/04, ¶ 33; Inuit
Tapiriit Kanatami v. European Commission, [2013] EUECJ T-526/10 at ¶ 33.
80. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, 1992: The Case of Financial Services, 12 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 124 (1991).
81. See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, New Frontiers in EC Capital Markets Law: From Market
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But Member States took advantage of some uncertainty about the
extent to which EU directives permitted them to regulate banks and
other financial firms authorized in other Member States. EU
directives did not always apply to specific circumstances, such that
sometimes the question fell to be considered by reference to the
general Treaty rules on freedom of establishment.82 The Commission
acted to try to discourage Member State regulation of the activities of
firms from other Member States. After carrying out a consultation
exercise, in 1997 the Commission published an interpretative
communication that it described as providing “a reference document
defining the legal framework within which, in the view of the
Commission, banking activities benefiting from mutual recognition
should be pursued.”83
Since 1997 the EU has adopted more detailed harmonized rules
to protect consumers of financial services, thus limiting more
explicitly the Member States’ ability to apply their own distinct rules
that could reduce competition in the financial markets. The Markets
in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)84 replaced the earlier
Investment Services Directive and included new provisions for
conduct of business rules that the home Member State was obliged to
apply to the firms it authorized, although host States were allowed to
supervise branches based in their territory.85 Member States were
Construction to Market Regulation, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 809, 810 (2003).
82. See, e.g., CaixaBank France v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de
l’Industrie, Case C-442/02 [2004] ECR I-8961, [2004] EUECJ C-442/02; Eleanor Spaventa,
Case C-442/02, Caixa-Bank France v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de
l’Industrie., 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1151 (2005) (critiquing the decision).
83. Commission of the European Communities, Interpretative Communication: Freedom
to Provide Services and the Interest of the General Good in the Second Banking Directive,
SEC (97) 1193 Final (June 1997), at 3.
84. Directive 2004/39/EC on Markets in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J. L 145/1
[hereinafter MiFID]. This Directive was replaced by Directive 2014/65/EU on Markets in
Financial Instruments, 2014 O.J. L 173/349 [hereinafter MiFID 2] and Regulation (EU) No
600/2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments, 2014 O.J. L 173/84 [hereinafter MiFIR]. The
difficulties of implementing MiFID 2 led the Commission to propose postponing the date for
implementation. Commission Press Release, Commission Extends by One Year the
Application Date for the MiFID II Package (Feb. 10, 2016).
85. See MiFID, supra note 85, at recital 32 (“By way of derogation from the principle of
home country authorization, supervision and enforcement of obligations in respect of the
operation of branches, it is appropriate for the competent authority of the host Member State to
assume responsibility for enforcing certain obligations specified in this Directive in relation to
business conducted through a branch within the territory where the branch is located, since that
authority is closest to the branch, and is better placed to detect and intervene in respect of
infringements of rules governing the operations of the branch.”) and Art. 32 (7).
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required to co-operate with each other where necessary.86 The EU has
also adopted other specific measures designed to protect the interests
of financial services customers.87 More harmonization reduces the
space within which the Member States may regulate unilaterally.
The intensity of harmonization varies between retail and
wholesale market activity. Member States have retained the ability to
regulate to protect consumers of financial services, although there are
some harmonization measures in this area such as the Payment
Accounts Directive88 and the Mortgage Credit Directive,89 a measure
that took more than a decade to achieve.90 In 2015 the Commission
moved towards further harmonization of the retail financial services
market by publishing a Green Paper on retail financial services which
emphasized the gains to be made from opening up the EU’s retail
financial services market to more competition and cross-border
activity:
Retail finance provides a number of services that are essential for
citizens: where we keep our money, how we save for our old age,
how we pay for a house or other purchases, how we insure
ourselves or our property against health problems or accidents.
Developing effective Europe-wide markets for these services will
improve choice for consumers, allow successful providers to
offer their services throughout the EU, and support new entrants
and innovation. But Europe-wide markets in retail financial
services do not really exist at present. Only a small minority of
retail financial service purchases take place across borders. There
are many good products which exist in domestic markets, but it is
difficult for consumers in one EU Member State to buy products
provided in another. This does not just limit choice. Evidence
shows that prices vary widely across the EU: for example, motor

86. See id. art. 56.
87. See, e.g., Directive 2014/92/EU on the Comparability of Fees Related to Payment
Accounts, Payment Account Switching and Access to Payment Accounts with Basic Features,
2014 O.J. L 257/214.
88. Id.
89. Directive 2014/17/EU on Credit Agreements for Consumers Relating to Residential
Immovable Property, 2014 O.J. L 60/34.
90. See, e.g., id. at recital no. 1 (“[i]n March 2003, the Commission launched a process
of identifying and assessing the impact of barriers to the internal market for credit agreements
relating to residential immovable property.”).
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insurance for the same customer can be twice as expensive in
some Member States than in others.91

But the lack of cross-border activity involving consumers is not just
an issue relating to financial services. Generally, there is less crossborder consumer transacting than the Commission would like to see,
and the Commission’s proposed solution is more regulatory
harmonization.92 Regulatory harmonization can be described in such a
context as being consistent with Better Regulation — one set of EU
rules is better than multiple national rules.93 The Commission
proposes to improve implementation, monitoring, compliance and
enforcement with respect to EU law, which it also suggests is
consistent with Better Regulation.94 The logical end of this sort of
argument would seem to be complete regulatory uniformity
throughout the EU. Complete regulatory uniformity is likely neither
desirable95 nor achievable. The Member States have not yet agreed to
such uniformity and are unlikely to do so.
EU rules of financial regulation have become more detailed and
expansive over time, increasingly limiting the discretion of the
Member States. Where EU rules are established in directives, they
must be implemented in the legal systems of the Member States, even
if the Member States have in fact no or very little discretion with
respect to implementation. Over time, the Commission has
increasingly advocated more regulatory uniformity, rather than
merely approximation, as necessary to achieve the single market.96
Where directives allow the Member States to exercise discretion in
implementation, their exercises of discretion can create disincentives
for businesses and consumers to transact across geographic borders.
91. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Retail Financial
Services: Better Products, More Choice, and Greater Opportunities for Consumers and
Businesses, COM (2015) 630 Final (Dec. 2015) at p. 2.
92. Cf. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication on
Upgrading the Single Market: More Opportunities for People and Business, COM (2015) 550
Final (Oct. 2015) at 2 (“In many cases, one set of EU rules replaces a patchwork of 28
different national rules, making life easier for citizens and businesses, simplifying the legal
framework, reducing regulatory burden across the Single Market and increasing regulatory
predictability.”). Cf. OECD, Recommendation on Consumer Protection in E-commerce (2016).
93. Upgrading the Single Market, supra note 93.
94. Id. at 16.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 127-28.
96. See, e.g., Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial
practices in the internal 2005 O.J. L 149/22 (noting the need for uniform rules to encourage
cross border commerce).
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Uniform rules are less apt to constitute barriers to cross-border trade.
Regulatory uniformity may be expressed in directives that leave little
discretion to the Member States, or it may be expressed in regulations
that are directly applicable in all of the Member States without
implementation. Sometimes the aim of uniformity may be accepted as
an objective, but may not be achievable: differences in behavior in
different Member States may lead the Commission to accept the need
for stronger measures in some Member States.97 Uniform rules may
not in fact operate uniformly if there are differences in enforcement,
so the Commission focuses on reinforcing compliance by the Member
States.98
Just as harmonization of substantive rules of EU law relating to
financial services has intensified over time, so has the EU developed
more complex structures for the development and application of law
in this area. In 1999 the Commission published a Financial Services
Action Plan, which argued that the introduction of the euro created a
new opportunity to reduce the cost of capital and benefit users of
financial services while creating new challenges for financial
regulators.99 The Commission proposed an “aspirational programme
for rapid progress towards a single financial market.”100 Subsequently
the Lamfalussy Report developed details for the implementation of
the new plan to make financial regulation more flexible, using
different levels of regulation so the rules could be adapted to deal
with innovation and technological change and to improve
implementation and enforcement of the rules in the Member States.101
The EU institutions proceeded to put the plan into effect and adopted
a number of new measures more expeditiously than had been the case
with earlier financial regulation measures.102 The plan was limited in
97. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the
Application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, COM (2013) 138 Final (Mar.
2013), at 6 (“The results of the investigation reveal that it would not be appropriate, for the
time being, to remove the possibility, foreseen by the Directive, for Member States to go
beyond the level of harmonisation set by it in these specific sectors [financial services and
immoveable property].").
98. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 95.
99. Communication of the Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the
Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 (May 1999), at 3.
100. Id. at 4.
101. Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (Feb. 15, 2001) (Lamfalussy Report).
102. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document, The Application of the Lamfalussy
Process to EU Securities Markets Legislation: A Preliminary Assessment by the Commission
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scope as the new measures were designed to apply to trading of
securities in regulated markets, rather than to the trading of securities
generally.103
During the financial crisis, the Lamfalussy committee structure
evolved into a set of EU-level authorities.104 These new authorities
represented an evolution of the Lamfalussy committee structure rather
than the creation of entirely new agencies, but the new authorities had
new powers,105 although the involvement of national regulators in
their work does create some risks that conflicts of interest may
interfere with decision-making.106
The European Securities Markets Authority (“ESMA”) even
became an EU-level regulator, first of credit rating agencies, and then
later of trade repositories.107 ESMA also has intervention powers with
respect to short selling.108 The UK challenged these powers, arguing
that they constituted an impermissible delegation of authority to
ESMA. The Court of Justice held that “the powers available to ESMA
under Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012 are precisely delineated
and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives
established by the delegating authority. Accordingly, those powers
comply with the requirements laid down in Meroni v. High
Authority.”109 In addition, the powers conferred on ESMA to control
short selling were “in fact to improve the conditions for the
establishment and functioning of the internal market in the financial
Services, SEC (2004) 1459 (Nov. 15, 2004) at p. 6. The measures were a Market Abuse
Directive, a Prospectus Directive, a Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, and a
Transparency Directive. See Lamfalussy Report.
103. See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law
After the Financial Services Action Plan?, 14 STAN. J. L, BUS. & FIN. 43, 53-54 (2008).
104. See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, Reform or Revolution? The Financial Crisis, EU
Financial Markets Law, and the European Securities and Markets Authority, 60 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 521 (2011); The da Larosiere Group, The High-Level Group on Financial
Supervision in the EU (Feb. 25, 2009).
105. See, e.g., Madalina Busuioc, Rule-Making by the European Financial Supervisory
Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope, 19 EUR. L. J. 111, 112 (2013) (“While not entirely new, in
light of their institutional predecessors, in terms of their powers however, the Authorities are
regarded as a significant shift both within the context of EU agencification phenomenon and
also for the regulation of financial markets.”).
106. See, e.g., id. at 120-22.
107. See, e.g., ESMA, ESMA’s Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade
Repositories 2015 Annual Report and 2016 Work Plan (Feb. 5, 2016).
108. Commission Regulation 236/2012 of Mar. 14, 2012, Short Selling and Certain
Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, 2012 O.J. L 86/1.
109. United Kingdom v. European Parliament (Judgment of the Court) (2014) EUECJ
C-270/12 (Jan. 22, 2014) ¶ 53.
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field” and were therefore validly adopted under Art 114 TFEU.110
Although the court’s judgment does seem to be influenced by a
perceived need to allow ESMA to respond to situations of crisis,111 it
represents a relatively expansive view of the role of EU agencies and
of the scope of Article 114.112
An additional issue of complexity within the EU’s structure of
financial regulation is that it involves a number of sectoral agencies
that have responsibilities with respect to different areas of financial
regulation. The EU institutions separate out responsibilities with
respect to insurance, banking and securities activities, although some
of the most complex issues in financial regulation involve overlaps
and interconnections between different sectors of finance and their
regulation.113 The EU’s sectoral agencies do work together through a
Joint Committee to address issues of common concern,114 just as the
transnational standard setting bodies sometimes work together in a
Joint Committee.115 Even closer integration of regulation across the
sectors would likely help enhance financial stability.
The architecture of financial services regulation in the EU has
evolved over time in response to a perceived need for greater
flexibility (Lamfalussy) or in response to crisis. The EU regime
involves a mix of centralized and decentralized elements.
Commentators have argued that the EU’s responses to the financial
crisis led in some ways to increasing centralization, empowering the

110. Id. at 116-17.
111. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 108 (“It should be noted that, faced with serious threats to the
orderly functioning and integrity of the financial markets or the stability of the financial
system in the EU, the EU legislature sought, by Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012, to
provide an appropriate mechanism which would enable, as a last resort and in very specific
circumstances, measures to be adopted throughout the EU which may take the form, where
necessary, of decisions directed at certain participants in those markets.”).
112. See, e.g., Babis, supra note 59, at 268 (arguing that “the Court’s wide interpretation
creates the risk that the scope of ‘harmonisation measures’ could be expanded almost
indefinitely, depriving Article 114 TFEU of its inherent limits, and thus stretching the
principle of legality and the compliance of EU legislation with the principle of conferral”).
113. See, e.g., IMF, Strengthening the International Monetary System—A Stocktaking 2
(Feb. 22, 2016) (noting that the “build-up of financial risks, particularly in nonbank financial
institutions, has highlighted imperfections in the oversight of the global financial system”).
114. See, e.g., EIOPA, EBA, and ESMA, Final Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on
Risk-Mitigation Techniques for OTC-Derivative Contracts not Cleared by a CCP under Article
11(15) of Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 (Mar. 8, 2016).
115. See, e.g., The Joint Forum, Developments in Credit Risk Management Across
Sectors: Current Practices and Recommendations (June 2015).
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ECB and the Commission.116 But in other respects centralization was
limited by the fact that even the EU agencies, which are responsible
for developing technical standards and administering the rules, are
combinations of EU and national actors. The system relies on cooperation between the EU institutions and the Member States for the
development and implementation of policy.
The Commission’s 2015 proposal for an EU Capital Markets
Union117 in name seems to echo the European Banking Union,
although it is designed for all of the Member States, rather than for
the eurozone, and aims to encourage financing of economic activity
through the capital markets because of weaknesses in the banking
sector.118 The Action Plan sets out the Commission’s objective “to
remove the barriers which stand between investors’ money and
investment opportunities, and overcome the obstacles which prevent
businesses from reaching investors.”119 The plan includes proposals to
achieve “a simple, transparent and standardised securitisation market”
in the EU.120 The Action plan also discusses crowdfunding121 and
amendments to the EU’s prospectus rules.122 With respect to
crowdfunding the Commission writes:
The EU should strike a careful balance between the objectives of
investor protection and continued expansion of crowdfunding.
116. See, e.g., Epstein & Rhodes, supra note 75.
117. See European Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union (Sept.
30, 2015) (hereinafter Capital Markets Union Action Plan). Some commentators have
suggested that the idea of a Capital Markets Union (and putting the UK Commissioner,
Jonathan Hill, in charge of the Financial Services portfolio in the Commission) was an attempt
to pacify the United Kingdom with respect to the Banking Union. But the Capital Markets
Union proposals will not be firmed up by the time the UK Brexit referendum occurs.
118. Jonathan Hill, Commissioner, Speech at the Seventh Bruges European Business
Conference “Capital Markets Union” (Mar. 18, 2016) (“European SMEs receive 75% of their
funding from banks. European companies are four times more reliant on banks than American
ones. And Europeans save at least three times as much in bank accounts as they do in capital
markets. Does this matter? Well, the crisis taught us what happens if you put all your eggs in
one basket. As the banking sector deleveraged, the liquidity needed to keep the European
economy growing disappeared. And companies, particularly SMEs, could no longer get the
funding they needed to invest, to launch new products, to compete.”).
119. Capital Markets Union Action Plan, supra note 118, at 4.
120. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Laying down Common Rules on
Securitisation and Creating a European Framework for Simple, Transparent and Standardised
Securitisation, 2 (Sept. 30, 2015). See also European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation
Amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions
and Investment Firms (Sept. 30, 2015).
121. Capital Markets Union Action Plan, supra note 118, at 7-8.
122. Id. at 12.
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Premature regulation could hamper, not foster, the growth of this
fast-growing and innovative funding channel.123

Thus, whereas recent developments in banking regulation have been
driven by a need to regulate banks more strictly to ensure financial
stability and confidence in the banking system,124 the idea of the
Capital Markets Union is presented as being about Better Regulation
in the sense of avoiding unnecessary regulation. When the
Commission launched the Capital Markets Union idea it also issued a
call for evidence on financial services regulation in the EU, inviting
information about rules affecting the ability of the economy to finance
itself and growth, unnecessary regulatory burdens, interactions,
inconsistencies and gaps, and rules giving rise to unintended
consequences.125 The Commission received 287 responses to the call
for evidence from governmental and non-governmental organizations
from individuals, firms and trade and consumer associations.126
Unsurprisingly, a number of the responses agreed with the idea that
unnecessary regulation should be avoided.
UK actors are known for questioning whether more
harmonization of financial regulation in the EU is indeed necessary,
but they are not the only ones who argue for limits on harmonization.
Subsidiarity and Better Regulation are acknowledgments of
(indeterminate) limits on EU-level action. These questions permeate
financial regulation,127 and rightly so, as regulatory uniformity might
123. Id. at 7.
124. See, e.g., Benoit Coeuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central
Bank, From Challenges to Opportunities: Rebooting the European Financial Sector, Address at
SZ (Süddeutsche Zeitung) Finance Day 2016 (Mar. 2, 2016) (“Clearly, the European financial
sector is facing a profoundly changed regulatory environment after the crisis. That applies to
quantity and quality of capital, to leverage, to funding profiles, to bail-in-able debt, to risk
management practices. Derivatives markets and market infrastructures have also been subject
to a comprehensive reform agenda.”).
125. European Commission Press Release MEMO/15/5735, Call for Evidence: EU
Regulatory Framework for Financial Services (Sept. 30, 2015).
126. See, e.g., Call for evidence: EU regulatory framework for financial services,
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/financial-regulatory-frameworkreview/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); Her Majesty’s Treasury, HM Treasury’s
Response to EU Commission’s Call for Evidence on EU Regulatory Framework for Financial
Services (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-responseto-eu-commissions-call-for-evidence-on-eu-regulatory-framework-for-financial-services.
127. See, e.g., Marta Simoncini, Legal Boundaries of European Supervisory Authorities
in the Financial Markets: Tensions in the Development of True Regulatory Agencies, 34 Y.B.
EUR. L. 319, 322 (2015) (noting that “the complexity of EU financial market regulations
caught between the subsidiarity approach and the centralization of responsibilities and tasks.
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tend to impede desirable as well as undesirable innovation. Some
commentators advocate more harmonization in financial regulation to
address systemic risk, others advocate more flexibility,128 and yet
others have suggested that a mix between harmonization and
regulatory competition might be optimal.129
In practice, the EU’s financial markets have involved a mix of
harmonization and regulatory competition. In some areas this mix is
changing in ways that may raise new questions about the single
market idea. Before the financial crisis the EU had some
harmonization with respect to deposit guarantees for credit
institutions, although the crisis showed that the differences between
national systems threatened financial stability.130 Since the crisis the
EU rules for deposit guarantees have been reformed131 and new
deposit guarantee arrangements have been proposed for the
eurozone.132 But even the new EU rules imagine that cross-border
deposit guarantee schemes might emerge through merger or
otherwise.133
Harmonized deposit guarantee schemes, particularly schemes
designed to achieve cross-border support of financial institutions
based in different Member States, are complicated from the
perspective of the single market. The idea of the single market is
based in part on the idea that successful firms which meet consumers’
needs and desires for goods and services at the right level of price and
quality should be able to succeed, and that firms that do not
These institutional limits are fundamental to understanding the legal difficulties of integrating
financial markets.”).
128. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of
Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON
REGULATION 1 (2014).
129. See, e.g., Jeanne-Mey Sun & Jacques Pelkmans, Regulatory Competition in the
Single Market, 33 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUDIES 67 (1995).
130. See, e.g., Howarth & Quaglia, supra note 2, at 108 (“It became evident that
different national schemes across the EU potentially distorted level playing field competition
and created the potential for bank runs because, in the event of financial crises, customers in
some Member States were prone to shift deposits to a bank headquartered in those Member
States with more generous guarantee schemes.”).
131. Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April
2014 on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, 2014 O.J. L 173/149.
132. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication,
Towards the Completion of the Banking Union, COM (2015) 0587 Final (Nov. 2015);
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Proposal for a European Deposit
Insurance Scheme, COM (2015) 0586 Final (Nov. 2015).
133. See supra note 132, at recital 4.
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appropriately respond to consumers’ desires should not be insulated
from market forces. Because of the importance of banks within the
financial system and the need to protect bank depositors and banks
generally from the risk of bank runs, bank regulation includes
provision for deposit guarantees. In the period since the financial
crisis regulators have tried to limit the moral hazard associated with
implicit government support of banks (e.g. “too-big-to-fail”),134 and
the European Banking Union involves a Single Resolution
Mechanism135 to centralize the power of resolution for the eurozone.
But deposit guarantee schemes remain an important component of
bank regulation. Maintaining a reliable and well-financed deposit
guarantee scheme within the eurozone would promote financial
stability, but it would also operate as a subsidy to banks based in
Member States that are less able than others to ensure the financing of
a sound deposit guarantee scheme. In a true single EU financial
market without unnecessary barriers between Member States and
without inappropriate subsidies to uncompetitive firms, banks without
access to reliable bank guarantee schemes might be expected to lose
business and fail.
CONCLUSION
The question of ensuring that the European Banking Union does
not undermine the EU’s single market in financial services is a
complex one, in part because the idea of the EU's single market has
evolved and continues to do so. The EU never had one idea of what
the single market should be; the idea of the single market and the
rules necessary to construct it developed over time in response to
changing circumstances and politics. Meanwhile, financial regulation
from a global or transnational perspective, rather than from the EU
perspective alone, has evolved to include a focus on financial stability
that demands that financial regulators and supervisors think about risk
and regulation in new ways. The ECB, with an overarching
responsibility for ensuring financial stability in the eurozone, is likely

134. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, Second Thematic Review on Resolution
Regimes (Mar. 18, 2016) at 5 (noting that “only a subset of the FSB membership – primarily
home jurisdictions of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) – has a bank resolution
regime with a comprehensive set of powers that are broadly in line with the FSB Key
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions”).
135. See supra note 45.
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to run into issues where the demands of financial stability conflict
with some conceptions of the single market.
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